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Abstract 
Theories in management strategy argue that CSR generates economic value either through 
enhancing corporate performance or through preserving corporate performance. The insurance-
like argument of CSR focuses on generating economic values through mitigating the adverse 
effects of negative events. This paper examines the insurance property of CSR in the context of 
cost of debt financing and tax avoidance. Specifically, I examine whether tax-avoiding firms with 
superior CSR performance enjoy a lower cost of debt financing. Using three measures of tax 
avoidance, two measures of cost of debt, and a measure of CSR based on KLD indicators, I find 
that firms with higher levels of tax avoidance and a better CSR performance have lower bond 
spread and superior credit rankings. Additional analysis indicates that tax-avoiding firms reduce 
their cost of debt mainly through enhancing positive CSR performance than reducing poor CSR 
activities. Further analysis reveals that firms with higher levels of tax avoidance (i.e. top quartile 
of tax avoidance) receive greater benefits from participation in CSR activities .These findings 
provide support for the hypothesis that firms utilize CSR activities to temper adverse effects of 
risky behaviors such as tax avoidance. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (hereafter “CSR”) activities and its economic determinants 
and consequences have been the subjects of much academic research over the past 20 years (see 
Huang and Watson 2015; Malik 2015; Gray et al. 1995 for general reviews of this literature). In 
one stream of research, there are two competing arguments as to how tax avoidance and CSR 
activities are related. One argument is that management’s inherent code of good business conduct 
drives a firm to pay taxes as evidence of the firm’s contribution to society.  Under this view, firms 
exhibiting strong CSR activities are expected to pay greater taxes relative to less responsible firms 
(Caroll 1979, Paine et al. 2005). Alternatively, some propose a trade-off between CSR and tax 
payment either because they are substitute contributions to society or because firms use CSR 
participation as an insurance policy to temper the negative perceptions about tax avoidance 
(Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009, Davis et al. 2016). For example, Davis et al. (2016) argue that 
paying taxes can detract from social welfare by reducing the resources that the company can 
otherwise use to create economic developments, jobs, and promotes social responsibility activities. 
Finally, some believe no underlying connection exists between corporate taxes and CSR, and no 
relationship should be observed between CSR and tax avoidance (Dowling 2014; Friedman 1970; 
Weisbach 2002).   
These different arguments motivate investigations into the relation between CSR and tax 
avoidance. The results, however, are mixed and at times contradictory. On one hand, some studies 
find that socially-responsible firms are less likely to avoid taxes (e.g. Hoi et al. 2013; Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012 and 2015; Hasan et al. 2016). For example, Hoi et al. (2013) find that socially-
irresponsible firms generally engage in more aggressive tax strategies. Similarly, Hasan et al. 
(2017) document that firms headquartered in counties exhibiting higher levels of social capital 
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incur higher effective cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs). This evidence suggests that firms 
view tax payments and CSR activities as complements to addressing managements’ view of the 
firms’ obligations to society (i.e., managers’ views of firms’ social obligations drive similar 
relative contributions of both taxes and CSR activities). On the other hand, Davis, et al. (2016) 
find that CSR activity levels negatively relate to five-year cash effective tax rates and positively 
relate to tax lobbying expenditures, which suggests that CSR shirking and tax payment serve as 
substitutes for one another. This conflicting evidence leaves open the question of how CSR activity 
and tax avoidance are related. For example, are there circumstances when CSR activities and 
effective tax rates are complements, and other circumstances where they are substitutes to each 
other? To address the mixed results in this arena, I examine the extent that the cost of debt affects 
the trade-off between taxes incurred and CSR activities.  
I argue that the relationship between CSR activities and ETRs is likely a function of the 
costs and benefits of fulfilling each of these “give-backs” to society. Thus, how much a firm 
engages in CSR activities largely depends on how much the firm is engaged in tax avoidance 
behavior, and vice versa (Davis et al. 2016). Stakeholder theory argues that stakeholders are 
heterogeneous in their expectations and the responsibility of managers is not only to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth but also to satisfy other stakeholders’ objectives (Freeman 1984). Introducing 
CSR activities into the stakeholder theory framework, Ullman (1985) argues that the determinants 
and economic consequences of CSR activities could be different depending on different 
stakeholder needs. If stakeholder interests prioritize expending resources on both CSR activities 
and paying taxes, then the two constructs will align and appear as complements to one another. On 
the other hand, when stakeholders view CSR and taxpaying activities as tradeoffs, then the 
constructs will be substitutes for one another.  
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Consider shareholder interests. Prior research indicates that equity-dominant firms value 
greater CSR participation because it indicates 1) stronger corporate character, 2) greater 
interactions with society (i.e., a broad range of stakeholders), 3) more customer and employee 
loyalty, 4) lower risk of incurring previously-externalized costs related to socially irresponsible 
behavior, 5) more efficient use of firm resources, leaving more resources available to pay debt, 
and 6) stronger managerial competence as signaled by their ability to effectively integrate CSR 
activities into firm operations (Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin 2014; Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, 
and Suh 2013; Goss and Roberts 2011). Tax avoidance also appears to be valuable to equity 
investors because it produces substantial cash tax savings that increases expected current cash 
flows and, hence, reduces the cost of equity capital (Goh et al. 2016). Given this discussion, 
shareholders are likely to view CSR activities and tax avoidance as complements for one another. 
Debtholders are exposed to the risks of tax avoidance but do not benefit from the 
corresponding rewards of tax savings. This is consistent with prior literature finding that 
debtholders impose higher costs on tax-avoiding firms because they consider them riskier (Hasan 
et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013). Debtholders, however, reward socially responsible firms with a 
lower cost of debt because CSR activities indicate greater stakeholder engagement, producing less 
chance of costly conflicts with stakeholders, lower firm risk, and efficient resource allocation 
(Attig et al. 2013; Cooper and Uzun 2015; Goss and Roberts 2011; Oikonomou et al. 2014). Putting 
CSR performance into a risk management framework, Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that engaging 
in CSR activities is not just an altruistic behavior but rather a key part of management strategy of 
companies. Participation in CSR activities sends a not self-interested signal that when received 
and accepted by external stakeholders, generates a positive attribution or moral capital. Theorists 
argue that the economic value of CSR activities is derived from the mitigating effect of the moral 
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capital in the event of negative event (Godfrey 2005).Given this, I argue that firms that engage in 
aggressive tax avoidance can increase their CSR participation to mitigate the adverse effect of 
involvement in tax avoidance behavior. This is consistent with the perspective that the economic 
value of CSR engagement results from the moral capital, derived from CSR, that can be used to 
temper the negative effects of events such as tax avoidance (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009, 
Davis et al. 2016).  
Prior literature also provides evidence of the insurance application of CSR activities against 
variety of firm risks. Christensen (2016) examines the deterrence and protection effects of CSR 
reporting and finds that firms that issue CSR reports are less likely to involve in a high-profile 
misconduct such as bribery, kickback, and discrimination. He also finds that in the event of a 
misconduct, firms that have previously disclosed CSR reporting experience a less negative market 
reaction. Minor and Morgan (2011) argue that firms use CSR activities to protect their reputation 
from adverse events such as product recalls, and they find evidence to support this view. Col and 
Patel (2016) study the actions of U.S. multinational firms that open facilities in tax haven countries. 
They find that firms tend to increase CSR activities after initiating operations in a tax haven 
country. Col and Patel argue that tax-haven firms protect themselves from negative reputational 
effect of establishing entities in offshore tax havens. In the same vein, firms could use CSR 
activities to temper the negative effects of tax avoidance behavior in order to enjoy a lower cost of 
debt. This is consistent with evidence that firms engaging in accounting practices to influence their 
earnings also tend to use CSR activities to deflect potential criticism from non-shareholders 
pertaining to these accounting activities (Prior et al. 2008). 
A counter argument based on the shareholder theory posits that firms should engage in 
socially-responsible activities only when such activities increase shareholder wealth (Friedman 
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1970). Under this view, resources should be dedicated to CSR activities only when only when they 
produce positive net present value (Davis et al. 2016). If tax avoidance and CSR both maximize 
firm value independently of one another, then we expect managers to engage in each activity 
independently of the other and, therefore, one construct has no impact on the effect of the other 
construct on credit risk. In other words, tax avoidance (CSR) is unrelated to the relation between 
CSR (tax avoidance) and credit risk. 
I examine five-year GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) for a sample of U.S. public 
corporations for which data pertaining to CSR activities is available from the MSCI historical 
dataset.  The CSR index is measured as total strengths minus total concerns (Kim et al. 2012; Hoi 
et al. 2013; Davis et al. 2016).  
GAAP ETR is the primary proxy for tax avoidance because Graham et al. (2014) find that 
managers care about GAAP ETRs more than they do about Cash ETRs; cash ETRs and the book-
tax-difference are employed as alternative measures of tax avoidance. Following Davis et al. 
(2016), the sample includes only U.S. corporations since tax regulations, and managers’ and 
shareholders’ perspectives on CSR activities, could be systematically different from other 
countries given cultural, institutional and legal differences across countries.  
I find that the CSR index moderates the relationship between tax avoidance and cost of 
debt. The coefficients of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance is significantly negative 
which suggests that cost of debt for tax-avoiding firms is lower among firms that are heavily 
involved with CSR activities. I find similar results using two alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
Further analysis reveals that the results are mainly driven by participation in positive CSR 
activities rather than by reducing negative CSR activities. In other words, firms engaged in tax 
avoidance increase positive CSR activities to alleviate the increased risk of tax avoidance and 
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enjoy a lower cost of debt, as a result. Additional analysis indicates that firms with higher levels 
of tax avoidance (i.e. top quartile of tax avoidance) receive a greater benefit from participation in 
CSR activities. Results support the view that firms increase CSR participation to offset the negative 
effects of involvement in tax avoidance behavior. This evidence is consistent with the trade-off 
between corporate tax payments and CSR activities. 
My study makes two important contributions to the CSR and tax avoidance literatures. 
First, I provide evidence on the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance, and reconcile the mixed 
results in prior studies that investigate the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. Second, 
consistent with risk management theory, I present evidence that firms use CSR activities to hedge 
risky behaviors and mitigate the negative effects of tax avoidance strategies on firm value (Hanlon 
and Slemrod 2009). 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the 
background and hypothesis development. Section three describes the research design. In section 
four findings and results are presented and discussed. Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
"There is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which 
is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud." (Friedman 1970). This 
shareholder wealth maximization view has been the cornerstone of much research that seeks to 
explain the causes and effects of CSR activities. Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that CSR activities 
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can maximize shareholders value either through generating corporate financial performance or 
protecting it.  
The wealth-generating properties of CSR are documented in the literature. Numerous 
studies examine the effects of CSR activities on corporate performance (e.g. Deng et al. 2013; 
Porter & Kramer 2002; Saiia et al. 2003; Brammer & Millington 2005) and find positive 
associations. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) examine the effect of CSR participation on firm’s cost of equity 
capital and find that firms that already have a higher cost of equity initiate superior CSR activities, 
which in turn results in a significant reduction in the subsequent cost of equity. Cheng et al. (2014) 
find that firms with superior CSR performance are significantly less financially constrained and 
this result is more pronounced for firms with better stakeholder engagement and more transparent 
CSR disclosure. To address endogeneity, Cheng et al. (2014) use various methods including an 
increase in the number of CSR indicators reported by MSCI, an instrumental variable approach, 
and a simultaneous equation. Deng et al. (2013) provide evidence that more socially responsible 
firms make stronger merger and acquisition decisions. Their findings show that acquisitions by 
high-CSR firms lead to greater announcement-related stock returns for acquiring firms.  
From a debt market perspective, the findings are mostly consistent with socially 
responsible firm incurring lower cost of debt financing. Menz (2010) investigates the relationship 
between Euro corporate bonds and participation in CSR activities, and finds very weak evidence 
that the marketable debts of high-CSR firms face greater risk premia. Similarly, Goss and Roberts 
(2011) examine the link between CSR and bank loan interest rates, and find that firms with poor 
social performance pay higher interest rates relative to more socially-responsible firms. 
Conversely, Oikonomou et al. (2014) examine two indicators of debt risk, the cost of debt and 
credit ratings, and find that, overall, firms with superior social performance have lower bond yield 
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spreads and higher bond ratings. Attig et al. (2013) focus on  credit ratings and find that more 
socially-responsible firms enjoy higher credit ratings and that the components of CSR that relate 
to primary stakeholder management (i.e., community relations, diversity, employee relations, 
environmental performance, and product characteristics) matter most in explaining 
creditworthiness. 
CSR can also maximize the wealth of shareholders through preserving economic values. 
A recent theory developed by strategy scholars suggests that CSR activities have an “insurance-
like” property that is perceived positively by stakeholders, who then temper their negative 
judgments and actions towards the firm because of this intangible property (Godfrey 2005; 
Gardberg and Fombrun 2006; Godfrey et al. 2009). Business activities differently impact various 
groups of stakeholders (Godfrey et al. 2009; Watson 2015). For example, tax avoiding activities 
generate values for shareholder but impose additional risk on creditors. . From a risk management 
perspective, theorists argue that CSR can act as means of mitigating, or protecting the firm against, 
the adverse consequences of negative events (Godfrey 2005; Gardberg and Fombrun 2006).   
Tax avoidance generates cash flows for shareholders by reducing the share of profits paid 
to tax authorities. Thus, equity investors generally desire tax avoidance since most tax avoidance 
produces tax benefits with positive net present values (Goh et al. 2016). In other words, taxes saved 
from tax avoidance come with sufficiently low risk that firm value increases. Consistent with this 
view, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find a positive association between tax avoidance and firm 
value and this relation is more pronounced in the presence of strong corporate governance. 
Similarly, Drake et al. (2017) find a positive link between Cash ETR and Tobin’s q and a negative 
link between tax risk (Cash ETR volatility) and Tobin’s q. Wilson (2009) investigates the stock 
returns of firms engaging in corporate tax shelters and finds that positive returns are concentrated 
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in well governed firms. Finally, in a more recent study Goh et al. (2016) examine the link between 
tax avoidance and cost of equity capital and, using multiple measures of tax avoidance and cost of 
equity capital, document a negative and significant association. Despite the empirical findings of 
the positive association between tax avoidance and firm value, other studies provide evidence of 
the negative impact of tax avoidance on firm value. For instance, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find 
that the market reacts negatively to news about corporate involvement in tax shelters, and that this 
effect is more pronounced for the retail sector, which is more prone to potential consumer backlash. 
Cook et al. (2017) examine the association between tax avoidance and ex ante cost of equity capital 
and find that ex ante cost of equity capital increases with changes in the investors’ expected levels 
of tax avoidance. 
From the perspective of debtholders, however, tax avoidance produces little or no benefit 
and increases firm risk. Unlike shareholders, debtholders are fixed claimants who generally do not 
benefit from the excess cash generated from tax avoidance (Hasan et al. 2014). Consistent with 
this argument, Hasan et al. (2014) examine the impact of tax avoidance on bank loan spreads and 
find that banks charge higher interest to firms engaged in tax avoidance.  
Taken together, debtholders seem to view CSR participation as rewarding while consider 
involvement in tax avoidance a risky behavior and punishable. From a risk management 
perspective, firms involved with aggressive tax avoidance may seek to increase CSR activities to 
mitigate the negative outcomes of this risky behavior. This is consistent with the perspective that 
CSR possesses insurance-like properties that can temper the negative present-value effects of a 
firm’s risky aggressive tax positions (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009, Davis et al. 2016).  
Prior literature also provides evidence of the insurance application of CSR activities against 
a variety of firm risks. Christensen (2016) examines whether CSR reporting protects firm value 
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and finds that, on average, firms that issue stand-alone CSR reporting are less likely to engage in 
CSR related misconduct. He also finds that issuing CSR reports in the years before a misconduct 
occurs can mitigate the negative market reactions to the incident. Minor and Morgan (2011) argue 
that firms use CSR activities to protect their reputation from adverse events such as product recalls, 
and they find evidence to support this view. Col and Patel (2016) study the behaviors of the U.S. 
multinational firms that open facilities in tax haven countries. They find that, subsequent to 
opening a facility in a tax haven country, firms tend to increase CSR activities. Col and Patel argue 
that these tax-haven firms protect themselves from possible negative reactions to establishing 
entities in offshore tax havens. In a similar vein, firms could use CSR activities to reduce possibly 
negative perceptions of their tax avoidance behavior in order to enjoy a lower cost of debt. This is 
consistent with evidence that firms engaging in income-increasing discretionary accruals tend to 
use CSR activities to deflect potential criticism from non-shareholders pertaining to these 
accounting activities (Prior et al. 2008). Based on the preceding discussion, I present my 
hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, tax avoiding firms that increase thier CSR participation enjoy a lower 
cost of debt financing. 
Extreme Tax Avoidance 
Godfrey et al. (2008) argue that the insurance-like property of CSR engagement is likely greater 
for firms that face negative events that jeopardize the well-being of certain stakeholders. In the 
same line, firms that are heavily involved in tax avoidance are more likely to get caught and as a 
results considered riskier and subject to higher cost of debt by debtholders. Extreme tax avoidance 
is easier to detect by stakeholders and punished if not hedged by more CSR participations. 
Therefore, high tax-avoiding firms have more incentive to participate in CSR activities because 
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the benefits of such participation is higher for these firms. Thus, I formulate my second hypothesis 
as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, relative to low tax-avoiding firms, high tax-avoiding firms that increase their 
CSR participation enjoy a lower cost of debt  
 
3. Research Method 
Firm credit ratings and bond yield spread serve as proxies for the cost of debt. Prior 
research relies on both measures of the cost of debt (Ahmed et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Jiang 
2008; Minton and Schrand 1999; Sengupta 1998; Shi 2003; Qui et al. 2010). Firm credit ratings 
represent rating agencies’ assessment of a firm’s credit worthiness and can affect a firm’s access 
to bank loans, bonds, and commercial paper markets; thus, they indirectly measure the cost of debt. 
I measure firm credit ratings with the S&P ratings obtained from Compustat. Yield spread directly 
measures a firm’s incremental cost of debt as the risk premium that firms incur in the bond market 
(Sengupta 1998; Shi 2003). Following Jiang (2008), yield spread is the difference between the 
firm’s bond yield to maturity and the Treasury bond yield with comparable maturity. 
Three proxies are used to capture a broad range of tax avoidance. The first measure is the 
five-year GAAP effective tax rate (“GAAP ETR”) that captures permanent tax voidance and is 
calculated as the sum of income tax expense over five years divided by the sum of pretax income 
for the same five-year period. The second measure of tax avoidance is the five-year cash ETR 
(“Cash ETR”) that measures temporary tax avoidance (De Simone et al. 2017). Following Dyreng 
et al. (2008), Cash ETR is the sum of taxes paid divided by the sum of the pretax income net of 
special items, calculated over five years. I also test the sensitivity of my results to Book-tax 
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difference (BTD) that captures both permanent and temporary tax avoidance (Goh et al. 2016; De 
Simone et al. 2017). BTD is defined as the total difference between book and taxable income.   
Following prior literature (Davis et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2012), I use KLD indicators to 
construct my measure of CSR activity. Specifically, CSR_Index is the sum of KLD strengths minus 
the sum of KLD weaknesses for each firm-year. CSR index scores are determined from the 
following five KLD categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and 
product (Davis et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2012).1  
Using the dependent and independent variables defined above, two regression models test 
whether the debt-related risks of tax avoidance are mitigated by CSR activities to lower the cost 
of debt. Control variables are adopted from prior literature (Davis et al. 2016; Edwards 2016; Jiang 
2008) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼9𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼14𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼19𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼20𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼21𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼22𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
                                                          
1 As in Davis et al. (2016) and Kim et al. (2012), I exclude the category for corporate governance to avoid merely 
capturing the effects of corporate governance, which does not directly impact society. I also drop Human rights 
category because it is not available after 2002. In sensitivity analyses, I construct another measure of CSR that 
includes government and human rights indicators and my results are generally unaffected.  
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∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼4∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8∆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼9∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼13∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼14∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼15∆𝐶𝐶&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼16∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼17∆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼18∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼19∆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼20𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼21𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
In models 1 and 2 above, a negative coefficient on the interaction, CSR_Index X TaxAvoid, would 
support H1.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Following prior literature (Edwards 2016; Jiang 
2008) I use a ‘‘rating change’’ model to test whether tax-avoiding firms improve their CSR 
performance to temper the negative perceptions about tax avoidance. In models (1) and (2) the 
variable of interest is the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance. If firms with higher levels 
of tax avoidance do more CSR activities to cover their risky behavior, i.e. tax avoidance, and enjoy 
a lower cost of debt, I expect that 𝛼𝛼3 be negative and significant in model (1) and positive and 
significant in model (2).  
 
Sample 
My sample combines observations with data on the Securities Data Company’s Global 
New Issues, Compustat, and MSCI databases. The sample initially consists of all firms for which 
data are available on MSCI for the years 1991 through 2016. My initial sample begins in 1991 and 
ends in 2016 because coverage in the CSR database is available from 1991 through 2016. The 
empirical tests require five years of data to calculate both GAAP ETR and Cash ETR, so I use 
Compustat data from 1987 through 2016 to calculate these variables. I exclude financial firms (SIC 
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6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999) because they are strictly regulated industries with 
unique operating characteristics and debt financing activities. Bond spreads for U.S. firms were 
retrieved from Securities Data Company’s Global New Issues database. Following Jiang (2008), I 
exclude convertible float-rate bonds and bonds with asset-backed or credit-enhancement features, 
because spreads for these bonds tend to capture the creditworthiness of the collateral rather than 
the creditworthiness of the firm (Campbell and Taksler 2003). For firms with multiple bond 
issuances during a given year, I only include the bond with the largest offering amount (Khurana 
and Raman 2003). I eliminate observations with five-year GAAP ETRs and cash ETRs greater 
than 1 or less than 0, and observations with missing data for any of the regression variables. This 
process results in a final sample of 2,786 observations for the bond spread and GAAP_ETR 
regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
effects of outliers. 
 
4. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. In panel A, the mean bond spread, Spread, is 1.93, 
which is slightly greater than reported by Jiang (2008) and Qui et al. (2010), which is possibly due 
to my inclusion of recession observations from the years 2008 and 2009. The mean and standard 
deviation for change in credit rating, ∆S&PRatingt+1, are -0.05 and 0.646, respectively, and these 
are comparable to Edwards (2018). The mean CSR_Index is 1.007, suggesting that firms in my 
sample have on average more CSR strengths than weaknesses. The mean and standard deviation 
of GAAP_ETR and Cash_ETR are similar to those in prior studies (Davis et al. 2016; Guenther et 
al. 2017).  Another key point is that firms in my sample are relatively large, (mean, 25th percentile, 
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and 75th percentile, are 8.699, 7.787, and 9.57, respectively) with low standard deviation 
(Std.dev=1.363).2 
 Panel B of Table 2 provides univariate associations between variables. Notably, 
correlations between bond spread and both GAAP ETR and Cash ETR are positive (p<0.10), 
which suggests that tax-avoiding firms face greater debt risk. Bond spread and CSR, however, 
are negatively related (p<0.10); this provides initial support for the view that firms with higher 
levels of CSR activities enjoy lower costs of debt. 
 
Cost of Debt, CSR, and Tax Avoidance 
 Table 2 presents the initial results of estimating Model (1) to test whether tax avoiding 
firms are likely to do more CSR activities to ‘insure’ their risky behavior, i.e. tax avoidance, and 
thereby reduce the cost of debt. For this purpose, tax avoidance is proxied by GAAP_ETR. Column 
1 presents the result of estimating Model (1) without any control variables. Consistent with my 
expectation, the coefficient of the interaction, CSR_Index×GAAP_ETR , is negative and significant 
(p<0.01). This supports the view that firms that avoid taxes seek to reduce the cost of debt by 
engaging in CSR activities. And, given the trade-off between tax avoidance and not engaging in 
CSR activities, some firms choose to incur higher tax rates and avoid CSR activities. In column 
(2) the result of estimating Model (1) with all control variables is reported. Consistent with the 
results in column (1), the coefficient of the interaction, CSR_Index×GAAP_ETR, is negative and 
significant (p<0.01). Together, the results in columns (1) and (2) provide support for the first 
hypothesis that firms with higher GAAP ETR that have also higher level of CSR enjoy lower cost 
of debt.  
                                                          
2 The market value of the firm at 25th Pctl is $3,607,264,840 with lagged sales of $2,313,000,000 
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In Table 3, I report the results of estimating Model (1) when tax avoidance is measured 
using the book-tax difference, i.e. BTD. The results in both columns (1) and (2) are significant and 
consistent with my prediction that tax avoiding firms that have higher level of CSR have lower 
bond spread. The coefficients of the interaction, CSR_Index×BTD (α3) in columns (1) and (2) are 
-0.086 and -0.065, respectively, and statistically significant.   
 Table 4 presents the results of estimating Model (1) when tax avoidance is measured using 
Cash_ETR. Consistent with Table 2, Table 3 column (1) shows that firms facing higher Cash_ETR 
appear reduce the cost of debt, proxied by Spreadt+1, by engaging in more CSR activities. The 
results, however, disappear when control variables are added to the model in Column 2. Although 
the sign of the coefficient of the interaction, CSR_Index×Cash_ETR, is negative, consistent with 
my prediction, it is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. Although this lack of 
results is somewhat disconcerting, this is not uncommon in tax literature as each tax avoidance 
proxy measures a different type of tax avoidance (De Simon et al. 2018).   
  
 The results of estimating model (2) are reported in Table 5. In column (1) of Table 5, tax 
avoidance is measured by GAAP_ETR. The coefficient of the interaction, 
CSR_Index×GAAP_ETR, is positive and significant (P<0.01), which suggests that firms with 
higher levels of tax avoidance and CSR activities are assessed positively by credit rating agencies, 
relative to firms with lower levels of these variables. The column (2) results, where tax avoidance 
is measured using Cash_ETR are consistent with the results in column (1) and support my 
prediction. In column (3) where tax avoidance is measured using BTD, the coefficient of the 
interaction CSR_Index×BTD is not significant.  
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 Overall, the results of estimating model (1) and model (2) support my first hypothesis 
that tax-avoiding firms, measured through GAAP ETR, Cash ETR, and BTD, can reduce 
debtholders perception of company’s risk and pay lower premium on their bond by engaging in 
more socially responsible activities. 
 Next, I examine the effects of CSR strengths and weaknesses, separately, on the relation 
between tax avoidance and cost of debt to test whether the results are driven by engaging in more 
positive CSR, avoiding poor CSR activities or both. Tables 6 and 7 present the results of estimating 
model (1) and model (2), when CSR is measured using sum of strengths indicators from KLD. 
Table 6 column (1) presents the results of estimating model (1) when CSR is measured using sum 
of all strengths indicators and tax avoidance is measured using GAAP ETR. The coefficient of the 
interaction Strength× GAAP_ETR is negative and significant, suggesting debtholders value 
positive CSR activities and reward tax avoiding firms with lower cost of debt. The results reported 
in columns (2) and (3) using the other two measures of tax avoidance, i.e. Cash ETR and BTD, are 
consistent with those in column (1) and support my argument. Regression results for model (2) 
which tests the impact on firm’s credit rating of jointly doing positive CSRs and tax avoidance, 
are reported in Table 7. Column (1) includes GAAP ETR as the measure of tax avoidance and 
CSR strengths as the measure of CSR. The coefficients of 0.155 on the interaction between CSR 
strength and GAAP_ETR is positive and significant (P<0.05 two tailed), providing support for my 
hypothesis. In columns (2) and (3) the regression includes Cash ETR and BTD as the measure of 
tax avoidance, respectively. Similar to column (1) CSR is measured using CSR strengths. In 
column (2) consistent with the results in column (1), the coefficient of 0.128 on the interaction 
between CSR strength and Cash_ETR is positive and significant (P<0.05, one-tailed). In column 
(3) where tax avoidance is measured using BTD, although the coefficient on the interaction term 
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is positive, it is not statistically significant. The coefficients on the main effect of CSR is negative 
and significant (p<0.01, two-tailed) in all three specifications in Table6, suggesting that 
debtholders consider CSR activities valuable and rewarding. In Table 7, the coefficients on the 
main effect of CSR is positive and significant (p<0.01, two-tailed), indicating that credit agencies 
also value CSR information and assign a better rating to firms with more positive CSR.  
 The results for testing the impact of CSR concerns on the relation between tax avoidance 
and cost of debt are presented in Table 8 and 9 for model (1) and (2), respectively. Except in 
column (3) of Table 9, in all other specifications the coefficients of the interaction 
Concern×TaxAvoid is not significant, providing evidence that performing poorly on CSR and 
avoiding taxes jointly does not effect the view of debtholders and credit agencies about a firm.  
 
Extreme Tax Avoidance 
To test my second hypothesis, that high-tax avoiding firms are more likely to participate in CSR 
activities than low-tax avoiding firm, to reduce their cost of debt financing, I create a dummy 
variable, High_TaxAvoid, for high tax avoidance firms based on the top quartiles of GAAP ETR, 
Cash ETR, and BTD, and replace the dummy variable with the continuous tax avoidance variables 
in models (1) and (2). Specifically, I run the following models: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡× 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼8𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼13𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼14𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼16𝐶𝐶&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼18𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼19𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼20𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼21𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼22𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
 
 
 
 
(5) 
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∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡× 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼8∆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼12∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼14∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼15∆𝐶𝐶&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼16∆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼17∆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼18∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼19∆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼20𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼21𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
The results of estimations of models (5) and (6) are reported in tables 10 and 11, respectively. In 
table 10, columns (1) and (3), the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and significant, 
providing support for my second hypothesis that higher tax avoidance firms, relative to lower tax 
avoidance firms benefit more from engaging in CSR activates and enjoy a lower cost of debt 
financing.  In column (3) where Cash_ETR is the dummy variable for the top quartile of Cash 
ETR, consistent with columns (1) and (3), the coefficient of the interaction term is negative but 
not statistically significant. The results of estimating model (6) is shown in table 11. Consistent 
with my second hypothesis, in column (1), where tax avoidance is measured using a dummy 
variable for the top quartile of GAAP ETR, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant 
and positive. In columns (2) and (3) the coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant. 
Overall, these results provide some evidence that firms with higher level of tax avoidance benefit 
more from participation in CSR activities than firms with lower levels of tax avoidance. 
  
Sensitivity Analysis 
 The measure of CSR that has been used so far in the analysis excludes corporate governance and 
human rights indicator. I construct another measure of CSR, i.e. CSR2_Index, by introducing 
governance and human rights indicators to the original measure and repeat the whole analyses. 
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The results for the main analysis are reported in tables 12 and 13.Overall the results are generally 
consistent with the results in tables 2 to 5 in which CSR measure excludes governance and human 
right indicators.  Udayasankar (2008) argues firms with different size have varying incentives of 
engaging in CSR activities. Udayasankar (2008) proposes a model in which very small and very 
large firms are equally motivated and likely to participate in CSR. Based on this model medium 
firms have the least motivated to participate in CSR initiatives. Given this, Udayasankar (2008) 
suggests that the relation between firm size and CSR is a U shape, i.e. polynomial. To account for 
the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between size and CSR, I estimate model (1) and (2) 
after replacing size with squared size as a control variable. The results (untabulated) are consistent 
and in most cases stronger.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Using risk management framework I generate a testable hypothesis that relates the joint effect o 
CSR and tax avoidance on cost of debt. Using three measures of tax avoidance, two measures of 
cost of debt, and a measure of CSR performance constructed using KLD indicators, I examine and 
find that tax avoiding firms increase their CSR activities to lower their cost of debt. Further 
analysis reveals that tax avoiding firms achieve this goal mainly by increasing their positive CSR 
activities and not by reducing negative CSR performance. I also provide some evidence that higher 
tax avoidance firms, relative to lower tax avoidance firms benefit more from participation in CSR 
activates and have a lower cost of debt financing. Also, I examine the sensitivity of my results 
using an alternative measure of CSR that includes governance and human rights indicators and 
obtain similar results. Further I test the sensitivity of the results to nonlinear relationship between 
CSR performance and firm size and find consistent and even stronger results. 
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Appendix A. Variable definition and measurement 
∆Ratingit+1 Ratingit+1 - Ratingit,, where Ratingit is firm i’s Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA 
(extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments) and are 
converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA). 
Spreadt+1 Yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued 
in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. 
Following Qi et al. (2010), if there is no Treasury security with similar 
maturity available to match the duration of the corporate bond, the yield-
to-maturity on the Treasury security is calculated as the linear interpolation 
between the two closest maturity matches. 
CSR_Index Total strengths minus total weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating 
categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and 
product. 
GAAP_ETR The sum across years t-4 through t of income tax expense (Compustat 
TXT) divided by the sum of the pretax income (Compustat PI) for the 
same years. Following prior literature (e.g. McGuire et al. 2012; Higgins et 
al. 2015) GAAP ETRs below 0 and greater than 1 are dropped. I multiply 
GAAP ETR by -1, so that higher values of GAAP_ETR indicate greater tax 
avoidance. 
Cash_ETR The sum from year t-4 to t of cash taxes paid (Compustat TXPD) divided by 
the sum of pretax income (PI), net of special items (SPI), for the same years. 
Following prior literature (e.g. Goh et al. 2016; McGuire et al. 2012; Higgins 
et al. 2015) ETRs below 0 and greater than 1 are dropped. I multiply Cash 
ETR by -1, so that higher values of Cash_ETR indicate greater tax 
avoidance. 
BTD Book-tax difference, the excess of pretax income over inferred taxable 
income, deflated by prior-year total assets. The variable is measured using 
Compustat variables as: 
 BTD = {PIt – [(TXFEDt + TXFOt)/0.35 – TLCFt]} / ATt-1. 
Size Following Inger and Vansant (2019) The natural log of prior-year total sales 
(Compustat SALEt-1). 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income (Compustat NIt) deflated by prior-
year total assets (Compustat ATt-1). 
CFO Operating cash flows (Compustat OANCF), deflated by total assets 
(Compustat ATt-1). 
Loss Dummy variable set to 1 for positive net income (Compustat NIt), 0 
otherwise. 
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Leverage Long-term debt (Compustat DLTTt) divided by total assets (Compustat 
ATt). 
INTCOV The natural logarithm of 1 plus the interest coverage ratio for the firm. The 
interest coverage ratio is calculated as income before interest and 
depreciation (Compustat  OIBDP + XINT) divided by interest expense 
(Compustat  XINT) for year t. 
 
Capital Capital intensity is calculated as firm’s property, plant, and equipment net 
of depreciation (Compustat PPENT) at fiscal year-end t, deflated by lagged 
total assets (Compustat  AT). 
SUB Dummy variable set to 1 for firm-years with a positive value for 
subordinated debt (Compustat DS), 0 otherwise. 
BTM Book-to-market ratio is calculated as book value of a firm’s common 
stockholders’ equity (Compustat CEQ) divided by its market value of equity 
(Compustat PRCC_F * CSHO) at fiscal year-end t. 
Return Change in the market value of the firm’s stock (Compustat PRCC_F) during 
year t deflated by the market value of the firm’s stock at fiscal year-end t-1. 
Intang Intangible assets (Compustat INTAN) divided by lagged total assets 
(Compustat AT). 
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expense (Compustat XSGA) divided 
by lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
R&D Research and development expense (Compustat XRD) divided by lagged 
total assets (Compustat AT). 
Cash Cash and cash equivalents (Compustat CHE) divided by lagged total assets 
(Compustat AT). 
Tax_Bnft_Opt Tax benefit of stock options (Compustat TXBCOF) divided by lagged total 
assets (Compustat AT). 
For_Inc Absolute value of pretax foreign income (Compustat PIFO) divided by the 
absolute value of pretax total income (Compustat PI). 
NOL Amount of tax loss carryforward (Compustat TLCF) divided by lagged total 
assets (Compustat AT). 
Senior Dummy variable set to 1 if bond is senior and 0 otherwise. 
CreditSensitive Dummy variable set to 1 if bond is credit sensitive and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Measures of central tendency 
Variable N Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
25th 
percentile 
75th  
percentile 
Spread 2786 1.928 1.797 0.650 2.990 
∆S&PRatingt+1 9314 -0.050 0.646 0.000 0.000 
CSR_Index 2786 1.007 3.332 -1.000 3.000 
CSR2_Index 2786 0.562 3.516 -2.000 2.000 
Strengths 2786 3.146 3.182 1.000 5.000 
Weaknesses 2786 2.135 2.023 1.000 3.000 
GAAP_ETR 2786 -0.327 0.112 -0.379 -0.276 
Cash_ETR 3133 -0.251 0.121 -0.321 -0.175 
BTD 3174 0.084 0.475 0.008 0.084 
Size 2786 8.699 1.363 7.787 9.570 
ROA 2786 0.068 0.061 0.033 0.101 
CFO 2786 0.124 0.070 0.080 0.161 
Leverage 2786 0.245 0.148 0.143 0.322 
INTCOV 2786 2.578 0.800 2.066 2.946 
Capital 2786 0.385 0.289 0.157 0.564 
BTM 2786 0.415 0.289 0.228 0.547 
Return 2786 0.090 0.352 -0.121 0.264 
Intang 2786 0.215 0.231 0.025 0.340 
SG&A 2786 0.197 0.173 0.065 0.272 
R&D 2786 0.019 0.032 0.000 0.025 
Cash 2786 0.091 0.103 0.022 0.124 
Tax_Bnft_Opt 2786 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
For_Inc 2786 0.352 0.599 0.000 0.492 
NOL 2786 0.040 0.101 0.000 0.034 
Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile of all continuous variables used in the 
analyses. Panel B presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables in the lower-left quadrant and Spearman 
correlations in the upper-right quadrant. Correlations significant at the 10% level or lower are shown in bold (two tail). 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate correlations (Pearson in the lower left; Spearman in the upper right) 
 
 
 
Spread CSR_In
dex 
GAAP
_ETR 
Cash_E
TR 
BTD Size ROA CFO Levera
ge 
INTCO
V 
Capita
l 
BTM Return Intang SG&A R&D Cash Tax_B
nft_Op
t 
For_In
c 
Spread  -0.59 0.099 0.190 0.160 -0.163 -0.158 -0.129 0.265 -0.158 -0.067 0.178 0.008 0.174 -0.174 -0.202 0.064 0.289 -0.056 
CSR_Index -0.100  0.143 0.053 0.128 0.238 0.216 0.167 -0.069 0.231 -0.170 -0.288 0.041 0.134 0.202 0.185 0.167 0.124 0.104 
GAAP_ETR 0.067 0.157  0.411 0.331 0.046 0.141 0.001 -0.026 0.107 -0.231 -0.105 0.065 0.176 0.000 0.332 0.276 0.196 0.303 
Cash_ETR 0.162 0.080 0.367  0.440 -0.081 -0.055 0.021 0.088 -0.043 -0.028 0.001 0.043 0.083 -0.198 0.088 0.065 0.111 0.092 
BTD 0.022 0.052 0.076 0.087  -0.072 0.267 0.163 0.036 0.117 -0.042 -0.106 0.088 0.113 -0.073 0.073 0.157 0.155 0.080 
Size -0.212 0.248 0.01 -0.092 -0.005  0.067 0.030 -0.091 0.109 -0.022 -0.132 -0.034 0.019 0.020 0.067 -0.011 -0.018 0.097 
ROA -0.211 0.184 0.126 -0.001 0.055 0.056  0.608 -0.310 0.669 -0.021 -0.507 0.036 0.038 0.304 0.160 0.270 0.226 0.013 
CFO -0.131 0.132 0.014 0.081 0.031 0.017 0.594  -0.174 0.542 0.300 -0.423 0.038 -0.095 0.187 0.035 0.155 0.141 -0.016 
Leverage 0.343 -0.077 0.005 0.081 0.009 -0.135 -0.277 -0.151  -0.665 0.136 0.003 0.010 0.100 -0.186 -0.296 -0.297 -0.039 -0.161 
INTCOV -0.198 0.206 0.071 -0.01 0.029 0.069 0.595 0.516 -0.626  -0.095 -0.334 0.001 0.040 0.270 0.238 0.372 0.254 0.137 
Capital 0.055 -0.189 -0.144 0.091 -0.006 -0.101 -0.02 0.298 0.144 -0.095  0.104 -0.054 -0.551 -0.242 -0.350 -0.370 -0.242 -0.254 
BTM 0.309 -0.253 -0.045 0.012 -0.022 -0.131 -0.442 -0.373 -0.039 -0.272 0.128  -0.153 -0.076 -0.320 -0.210 -0.154 -0.160 -0.065 
Return -0.030 0.042 0.047 0.055 0.026 -0.064 0.018 0.018 0.034 -0.036 -0.037 -0.183  0.033 -0.008 -0.005 0.105 0.079 -0.017 
Intang 0.108 0.109 0.102 0.062 0.009 -0.026 0.004 -0.071 0.113 -0.033 -0.414 -0.008 0.048  0.140 0.161 0.075 0.240 0.112 
SG&A -0.155 0.161 -0.027 -0.163 0.005 0.036 0.253 0.169 -0.137 0.223 -0.213 -0.275 -0.011 0.021  0.259 0.160 0.103 0.091 
R&D -0.150 0.214 0.202 0.106 0.111 0.037 0.183 0.148 -0.277 0.295 -0.27 -0.196 -0.016 0.019 0.189  0.281 0.058 0.451 
Cash 0.010 0.226 0.234 0.106 0.042 -0.048 0.278 0.234 -0.206 0.382 -0.296 -0.145 0.095 0.005 0.106 0.414  0.235 0.287 
Tax_Bnft_Opt 0.010 0.065 0.061 0.068 -0.001 -0.068 0.197 0.196 -0.021 0.2 -0.114 -0.197 0.102 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.199  0.129 
For_Inc 0.081 0.012 -0.056 -0.051 -0.007 0.020 -0.079 -0.051 0.007 -0.040 -0.037 0.061 -0.039 0.003 -0.016 0.034 0.023 -0.010  
NOL 0.028 0.041 0.057 0.054 0.994 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.011 0.013 -0.021 -0.007 0.024 0.010 0.015 0.106 0.028 -0.010 -0.002 
 
  
 Table 2 
 
Regression analyses to examine the effects of CSR activity, tax avoidance, and the interaction 
between CSR activity and tax avoidance on bond spreads 
 (1) (2) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 1.967*** (58.89) 2.525*** (18.06) 
CSR_Index -0.087*** (-7.98) -0.029*** (-3.28) 
GAAP_ETR 0.906*** (2.77) 0.314 (1.05) 
CSR_Index*GAAP_ETR -0.263*** (-3.06) -0.209*** (-2.78) 
Size   -0.239*** (-9.88) 
ROA   -2.900*** (-4.33) 
CFO   0.169 (0.27) 
Loss   0.323 (1.40) 
Leverage   2.402*** (7.00) 
INTCOV   0.027 (0.50) 
CAPITAL   0.140 (0.95) 
SUB   0.284*** (2.82) 
BTM   1.000*** (6.38) 
Return   0.119 (1.45) 
Intang   -0.343*** (-2.77) 
SG&A   0.202 (1.19) 
R&D   -0.633 (-0.71) 
Cash   0.538* (1.75) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt   -10.974 (-1.38) 
For_Inc   0.022*** (3.24) 
NOL   0.043 (0.52) 
Senior   -0.561*** (-4.04) 
CreditSensitive   -0.758*** (-5.06) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 2862 2786 
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.611 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads. The dependent 
variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, 
minus the U.S. Treasury bond yield for similar maturity. CSR is total strengths minus total weaknesses from the 
MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. Tax 
avoidance is measured using GAAP_ETR, the sum of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income, 
with the sums calculated for the years year t-4 through year t. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, 
respectively, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads 
 (1) (2) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.166*** (60.88) 2.724*** (21.15) 
CSR_Index -0.106*** (-8.94) -0.034*** (-3.36) 
BTD 0.568** (2.02) -0.969*** (-2.68) 
CSR_Index*BTD -0.086** (-2.19) -0.065* (-1.85) 
Size   -0.253*** (-10.04) 
ROA   -2.547*** (-3.67) 
CFO   0.100 (0.17) 
Loss   0.287 (1.32) 
Leverage   2.339*** (6.99) 
INTCOV   -0.038 (-0.69) 
CAPITAL   0.049 (0.34) 
SUB   0.221** (2.25) 
BTM   0.870*** (5.96) 
Return   0.145* (1.72) 
Intang   -0.411*** (-3.37) 
SG&A   0.389* (1.91) 
R&D   -0.674 (-0.75) 
Cash   0.461 (1.49) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt   -15.578* (-1.77) 
For_Inc   0.020*** (3.02) 
NOL   1.405*** (3.06) 
Senior   -0.530*** (-4.18) 
CreditSensitive   -0.826*** (-6.11) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3173 3051 
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.616 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads. The dependent 
variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, 
minus the U.S. Treasury bond yield for similar maturity.. CSR is measured as total strengths minus total 
weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product; tax avoidance is measured using BTD, calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + 
TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. The dependent variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date 
for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard 
errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on 
bond spreads 
 (1) (2) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.002*** (63.60) 2.572*** (20.57) 
CSR_Index -0.093*** (-9.23) -0.027*** (-3.22) 
CashETR 0.714** (2.44) 0.113 (0.45) 
CSR_Index*Cash_ETR -0.210** (-2.50) -0.055 (-0.78) 
Size   -0.241*** (-10.67) 
ROA   -2.131*** (-3.50) 
CFO   0.254 (0.45) 
Loss   0.268 (1.12) 
Leverage   2.404*** (7.83) 
INTCOV   0.016 (0.32) 
CAPITAL   -0.056 (-0.40) 
SUB   0.296*** (3.10) 
BTM   1.187*** (9.44) 
Return   0.139* (1.76) 
Intang   -0.460*** (-3.78) 
SG&A   0.288* (1.69) 
R&D   -0.730 (-0.84) 
Cash   0.172 (0.61) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt   -10.719 (-1.34) 
For_Inc   0.024*** (3.86) 
NOL   0.024 (0.33) 
Senior   -0.555*** (-4.46) 
CreditSensitive   -0.788*** (-6.02) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3133 3057 
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.612 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads. The dependent 
variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, 
minus the U.S. Treasury bond yield for similar maturity.. CSR is measured as total strengths minus total 
weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product; tax avoidance is measured using Cash_ETR, calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 
to year t of cash taxes paid  divided by the five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). The 
dependent variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in 
year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 5 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating 
    
 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 
CSR_Index 0.024** (2.45) 0.028*** (3.02) 0.031*** (3.55) 
GAAP_ETR 0.121 (0.51)     
CSR_Index* GAAP_ETR 0.245*** (3.17)     
Cash_ETR   -0.067 (-0.28)   
CSR_Index* Cash_ETR   0.194** (2.46)   
BTD     0.275* (1.66) 
CSR_Index* BTD     -0.061 (-1.13) 
∆Size 0.876*** (5.39) 0.752*** (4.32) 0.496*** (3.64) 
∆ROA 1.790*** (3.39) 1.207*** (2.68) 2.126*** (5.13) 
∆CFO 1.150** (2.21) 1.297*** (2.67) 1.826*** (4.18) 
Loss -0.786*** (-5.01) -0.733*** (-4.33) -0.789*** (-6.01) 
∆Leverage -1.856*** (-4.56) -2.019*** (-5.00) -2.357*** (-6.85) 
∆INTCOV 0.538*** (6.53) 0.567*** (7.13) 0.477*** (6.82) 
∆Capital -0.088 (-0.33) 0.063 (0.23) -0.113 (-0.47) 
SUB -0.162* (-1.91) -0.169** (-2.08) -0.176** (-2.51) 
∆BTM -0.924*** (-5.05) -0.461** (-2.49) -0.240* (-1.78) 
∆Intang 0.027 (0.31) -0.055 (-0.29) -0.034 (-0.43) 
∆SG&A -0.434 (-0.71) -0.524 (-0.72) -0.197 (-0.44) 
∆R&D 1.446 (0.97) 0.974 (0.39) 1.401 (1.27) 
∆Cash -0.337 (-1.11) -0.429 (-1.22) -0.195 (-0.95) 
∆Tax_Bnft_Opt -13.529 (-1.54) -0.144 (-0.01) -3.993 (-0.51) 
∆For_Inc 0.001 (0.26) -0.016 (-0.55) -0.001 (-0.19) 
∆NOL -0.000 (-0.02) -0.736 (-1.49) 0.005 (0.50) 
Return 0.823*** (8.61) 0.915*** (9.75) 0.762*** (8.00) 
S&PRatingt -0.113*** (-13.13) -0.114*** (-13.14) -0.106*** (-13.07) 
Observations 9314 9905 12341 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.068 0.066 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating. The dependent variable, 
∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in S&P firm’s credit rating from year t to year t-1, where Ratingit is firm i’s Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA (extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments) and are converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA). . CSR is measured as total strengths minus total 
weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; t 
GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income 
for the same five-year period. Cash_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid  divided by the 
five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} 
/ AT_lag. In all three columns, the dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is the change in firm’s Standard & Poor credit rating from 
year t to year t+1. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-
tail significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
 
  
Table 6 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR Strengths and tax avoidance on bond spreads 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.521*** (17.89) 2.573*** (20.56) 2.733*** (21.21) 
Strength -0.037*** (-3.50) -0.038*** (-3.91) -0.043*** (-3.81) 
GAAP_ETR 0.392 (1.26)     
Strength* GAAP_ETR -0.194** (-2.57)     
Cash_ETR   0.103 (0.42)   
Strength* Cash_ETR   -0.115* (-1.69)   
BTD     -0.980*** (-2.64) 
Strength* BTD     -0.095*** (-2.62) 
Size -0.209*** (-7.41) -0.206*** (-7.81) -0.215*** (-7.32) 
ROA -2.865*** (-4.21) -2.129*** (-3.50) -2.534*** (-3.54) 
CFO 0.160 (0.26) 0.222 (0.39) 0.060 (0.10) 
Loss 0.338 (1.44) 0.284 (1.18) 0.297 (1.36) 
Leverage 2.370*** (6.87) 2.396*** (7.85) 2.302*** (6.90) 
INTCOV 0.023 (0.42) 0.017 (0.33) -0.036 (-0.65) 
CAPITAL 0.166 (1.13) -0.032 (-0.23) 0.083 (0.58) 
SUB 0.280*** (2.77) 0.292*** (3.09) 0.218** (2.21) 
BTM 0.977*** (6.16) 1.176*** (9.41) 0.871*** (5.96) 
Return 0.115 (1.41) 0.131* (1.65) 0.135 (1.60) 
Intang -0.352*** (-2.81) -0.457*** (-3.75) -0.413*** (-3.36) 
SG&A 0.174 (1.02) 0.244 (1.45) 0.336* (1.66) 
R&D -0.475 (-0.52) -0.378 (-0.43) -0.433 (-0.48) 
Cash 0.510 (1.63) 0.196 (0.69) 0.447 (1.45) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt -11.011 (-1.34) -10.656 (-1.30) -14.491 (-1.64) 
For_Inc 0.021*** (3.01) 0.024*** (3.79) 0.020*** (2.96) 
NOL 0.043 (0.52) 0.025 (0.34) 1.550*** (3.34) 
Senior -0.557*** (-3.98) -0.556*** (-4.47) -0.541*** (-4.26) 
CreditSensitive -0.751*** (-4.99) -0.783*** (-5.97) -0.829*** (-6.13) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2786 3057 3051 
Adjusted R2 0.611 0.613 0.618 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR Strengths and tax avoidance on bond spreads. The dependent variable, 
Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the U.S. Treasury 
bond yield for similar maturity. Strength is CSR strengths measured as total strengths in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year 
t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income for the same five-year period. Cash_ETR is calculated as five-year 
sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid  divided by the five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). BTD is 
calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. In all three columns, the dependent variable, Spreadt+1, is 
the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar 
maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
 
  
Table 7 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR Strength and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 
Strength 0.034*** (3.15) 0.037*** (3.87) 0.033*** (3.60) 
GAAP_ETR 0.032 (0.13)     
Strength* GAAP_ETR 0.155** (1.98)     
Cash_ETR   -0.141 (-0.59)   
Strength* Cash_ETR   0.114 (1.36)   
BTD     0.319* (1.91) 
Strength* BTD     0.007 (0.13) 
∆Size 0.893*** (5.46) 0.773*** (4.43) 0.521*** (3.79) 
∆ROA 1.775*** (3.37) 1.193*** (2.65) 2.114*** (5.11) 
∆CFO 1.137** (2.19) 1.293*** (2.67) 1.824*** (4.17) 
Loss -0.811*** (-5.15) -0.762*** (-4.49) -0.798*** (-6.06) 
∆Leverage -1.860*** (-4.57) -2.030*** (-5.03) -2.353*** (-6.85) 
∆INTCOV 0.535*** (6.47) 0.562*** (7.06) 0.475*** (6.77) 
∆Capital -0.082 (-0.31) 0.056 (0.21) -0.108 (-0.45) 
SUB -0.171** (-2.02) -0.178** (-2.21) -0.177** (-2.53) 
∆BTM -0.943*** (-5.14) -0.476** (-2.57) -0.243* (-1.79) 
∆Intang 0.029 (0.33) -0.045 (-0.24) -0.029 (-0.37) 
∆SG&A -0.466 (-0.77) -0.542 (-0.74) -0.220 (-0.50) 
∆R&D 1.505 (1.01) 0.985 (0.40) 1.364 (1.24) 
∆Cash -0.331 (-1.10) -0.438 (-1.25) -0.198 (-0.97) 
∆Tax_Bnft_Opt -13.465 (-1.53) 0.146 (0.01) -3.995 (-0.51) 
∆For_Inc 0.001 (0.30) -0.016 (-0.55) -0.001 (-0.21) 
∆NOL -0.002 (-0.09) -0.760 (-1.54) -0.002 (-0.18) 
Return 0.817*** (8.57) 0.908*** (9.65) 0.763*** (7.99) 
S&PRatingt -0.121*** (-12.94) -0.122*** (-13.15) -0.109*** (-12.90) 
Observations 9314 9905 12341 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.068 0.066 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR strengths and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating. The dependent 
variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in S&P firm’s credit rating from year t to year t-1, where Ratingit is firm i’s Standard & Poor’s 
credit rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA (extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments) and are converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA).. Strength is CSR strengths measured as total strengths 
in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; GAAP_ETR is 
calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income for the same five-
year period. Cash_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI). BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. In all three 
columns, the dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in firm’s Standard & Poor credit rating from year t to year t+1. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
 
  
  
Table 8 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR Weaknesses and tax avoidance on bond spreads 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.523*** (17.81) 2.575*** (20.47) 2.724*** (20.91) 
Weakness 0.006 (0.32) -0.006 (-0.36) 0.013 (0.70) 
GAAP_ETR 0.394 (1.31)     
Weakness * GAAP_ETR 0.016 (0.09)     
Cash_ETR   0.134 (0.54)   
Weakness * Cash_ETR   -0.177 (-1.58)   
BTD     -1.027*** (-2.61) 
Weakness * BTD     -0.057 (-0.92) 
Size -0.265*** (-9.47) -0.255*** (-10.27) -0.291*** (-10.52) 
ROA -2.971*** (-4.35) -2.160*** (-3.54) -2.651*** (-3.72) 
CFO 0.092 (0.15) 0.227 (0.40) 0.013 (0.02) 
Loss 0.327 (1.41) 0.294 (1.20) 0.268 (1.23) 
Leverage 2.380*** (6.90) 2.376*** (7.79) 2.332*** (6.86) 
INTCOV 0.019 (0.35) 0.012 (0.23) -0.058 (-1.03) 
CAPITAL 0.161 (1.09) -0.047 (-0.34) 0.083 (0.58) 
SUB 0.269*** (2.73) 0.299*** (3.11) 0.222** (2.26) 
BTM 1.019*** (6.34) 1.217*** (9.63) 0.863*** (5.72) 
Return 0.136* (1.67) 0.148* (1.86) 0.167** (1.97) 
Intang -0.381*** (-3.02) -0.485*** (-3.99) -0.431*** (-3.51) 
SG&A 0.200 (1.15) 0.275 (1.62) 0.392* (1.82) 
R&D -1.337 (-1.46) -1.082 (-1.24) -1.119 (-1.22) 
Cash 0.434 (1.35) 0.061 (0.21) 0.487 (1.57) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt -9.962 (-1.25) -9.893 (-1.22) -15.655* (-1.78) 
For_Inc 0.021*** (2.79) 0.023*** (3.41) 0.020*** (3.02) 
NOL 0.042 (0.48) 0.022 (0.29) 1.113*** (2.68) 
Senior -0.566*** (-4.03) -0.560*** (-4.49) -0.535*** (-4.17) 
CreditSensitive -0.768*** (-5.08) -0.800*** (-6.08) -0.825*** (-6.05) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2786 3057 3051 
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.610 0.610 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR weaknesses and tax avoidance on bond spreads. The dependent variable, 
Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the U.S. Treasury 
bond yield for similar maturity. Weakness is CSR weaknesses measured as total weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating 
categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from 
year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income for the same five-year period. Cash_ETR is calculated 
as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). 
BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. In all three columns, the dependent variable, 
Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond 
yield with similar maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
two-tail significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
  
  
Table 9 
 
Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR Strength and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 
Weakness 0.009 (0.57) 0.008 (0.55) -0.006 (-0.42) 
GAAP_ETR 0.111 (0.46)     
Weakness * GAAP_ETR -0.135 (-0.95)     
Cash_ETR   -0.110 (-0.47)   
Weakness * Cash_ETR   -0.152 (-1.30)   
BTD     0.360** (2.16) 
Weakness * BTD     0.202* (1.67) 
∆Size 0.854*** (5.24) 0.730*** (4.20) 0.474*** (3.47) 
∆ROA 1.805*** (3.40) 1.207*** (2.67) 2.101*** (5.06) 
∆CFO 1.117** (2.14) 1.284*** (2.65) 1.829*** (4.20) 
Loss -0.818*** (-5.21) -0.764*** (-4.52) -0.781*** (-5.93) 
∆Leverage -1.835*** (-4.49) -1.977*** (-4.88) -2.327*** (-6.75) 
∆INTCOV 0.530*** (6.41) 0.564*** (7.05) 0.475*** (6.79) 
∆Capital -0.082 (-0.30) 0.061 (0.22) -0.115 (-0.47) 
SUB -0.168** (-2.01) -0.192** (-2.36) -0.184*** (-2.65) 
∆BTM -0.923*** (-5.01) -0.456** (-2.44) -0.244* (-1.80) 
∆Intang 0.028 (0.32) -0.054 (-0.29) -0.032 (-0.41) 
∆SG&A -0.437 (-0.72) -0.511 (-0.70) -0.197 (-0.44) 
∆R&D 1.352 (0.91) 0.843 (0.34) 1.331 (1.21) 
∆Cash -0.324 (-1.07) -0.443 (-1.26) -0.199 (-0.97) 
∆Tax_Bnft_Opt -13.700 (-1.56) -0.375 (-0.03) -4.096 (-0.52) 
∆For_Inc 0.001 (0.28) -0.016 (-0.55) -0.001 (-0.20) 
∆NOL 0.007 (0.32) -0.704 (-1.44) 0.003 (0.36) 
Return 0.829*** (8.65) 0.920*** (9.75) 0.766*** (8.01) 
S&PRatingt -0.106*** (-12.17) -0.107*** (-12.55) -0.097*** (-12.62) 
Observations 9314 9905 12341 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.067 0.066 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR weaknesses and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating. The dependent 
variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in S&P firm’s credit rating from year t to year t-1, where Ratingit is firm i’s Standard & Poor’s 
credit rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA (extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments) and are converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA). Weakness is CSR weaknesses measured as total 
weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; 
GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income for 
the same five-year period. Cash_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid divided by the five-year 
sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. 
In all three columns, the dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in firm’s Standard & Poor credit rating from year t to year 
t+1. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
 
  
Table 10 
 
Panel A: Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads for 
high vs. low tax avoiding firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.474*** (17.64) 2.521*** (20.17) 2.609*** (19.85) 
CSR_Index -0.013 (-1.39) -0.024*** (-2.70) -0.024** (-2.32) 
GAAP_ETR 0.217*** (2.91)     
CSR_Index * GAAP_ETR -0.057*** (-3.41)     
Cash_ETR   0.141** (2.26)   
CSR_Index * Cash_ETR   -0.016 (-1.00)   
BTD     0.205*** (2.76) 
CSR_Index * BTD     -0.052*** (-2.67) 
Size -0.237*** (-9.83) -0.239*** (-10.69) -0.245*** (-10.01) 
ROA -2.781*** (-4.22) -2.095*** (-3.46) -3.408*** (-5.60) 
CFO 0.180 (0.29) 0.252 (0.44) -0.079 (-0.13) 
Loss 0.330 (1.45) 0.264 (1.09) 0.356* (1.67) 
Leverage 2.403*** (7.04) 2.392*** (7.82) 2.360*** (7.04) 
INTCOV 0.038 (0.70) 0.022 (0.45) -0.016 (-0.29) 
CAPITAL 0.158 (1.09) -0.095 (-0.69) 0.034 (0.23) 
SUB 0.274*** (2.73) 0.280*** (2.93) 0.225** (2.23) 
BTM 1.018*** (6.52) 1.175*** (9.33) 0.822*** (5.55) 
Return 0.113 (1.39) 0.137* (1.74) 0.140* (1.66) 
Intang -0.333*** (-2.67) -0.465*** (-3.83) -0.351*** (-2.83) 
SG&A 0.220 (1.31) 0.313* (1.85) 0.491** (2.58) 
R&D -0.981 (-1.10) -0.993 (-1.16) -0.900 (-0.99) 
Cash 0.503 (1.64) 0.140 (0.49) 0.546* (1.79) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt -10.672 (-1.33) -10.887 (-1.34) -14.992* (-1.68) 
For_Inc 0.020*** (3.08) 0.024*** (3.87) 0.021*** (3.18) 
NOL 0.041 (0.51) 0.020 (0.28) 0.077 (0.67) 
Senior -0.567*** (-4.11) -0.544*** (-4.41) -0.481*** (-3.80) 
CreditSensitive -0.772*** (-5.18) -0.780*** (-5.96) -0.786*** (-5.81) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2786 3057 3051 
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.613 0.614 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spread for high versus low tax-avoiding firms. 
The dependent variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, 
minus the U.S. Treasury bond yield for similar maturity. CSR_Index is total strengths minus total weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five 
social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; GAAP_ETR is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for observations in the top quartile of GAAP_ETR and zero otherwise. Cash_ETR is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for observations in the top quartile of Cash_ETR and zero otherwise. BTD is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for observations in the top quartile of BTD and zero otherwise. In all three columns, the dependent variable, Spreadt+1, 
is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury bond yield with 
similar maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
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Table 11 
 
Panel B: Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating 
for high vs. low tax avoiding firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 
CSR_Index 0.012 (1.03) 0.024** (2.20) 0.032*** (3.42) 
GAAP_ETR 0.065 (1.05)     
CSR_Index * GAAP_ETR 0.044** (2.40)     
Cash_ETR   -0.095 (-1.43)   
CSR_Index * Cash_ETR   0.023 (1.07)   
BTD     0.306* (1.85) 
CSR_Index * BTD     -0.006 (-0.29) 
∆Size 0.877*** (5.38) 0.759*** (4.38) 0.500*** (3.66) 
∆ROA 1.786*** (3.38) 1.208*** (2.68) 2.127*** (5.14) 
∆CFO 1.143** (2.19) 1.301*** (2.68) 1.822*** (4.17) 
Loss -0.799*** (-5.11) -0.728*** (-4.30) -0.789*** (-6.01) 
∆Leverage -1.866*** (-4.57) -2.032*** (-5.03) -2.358*** (-6.86) 
∆INTCOV 0.536*** (6.50) 0.566*** (7.13) 0.478*** (6.82) 
∆Capital -0.089 (-0.33) 0.058 (0.21) -0.111 (-0.46) 
SUB -0.156* (-1.85) -0.160** (-1.97) -0.175** (-2.51) 
∆BTM -0.929*** (-5.08) -0.462** (-2.49) -0.240* (-1.77) 
∆Intang 0.030 (0.34) -0.054 (-0.29) -0.031 (-0.39) 
∆SG&A -0.453 (-0.75) -0.492 (-0.67) -0.199 (-0.45) 
∆R&D 1.550 (1.05) 0.950 (0.38) 1.374 (1.25) 
∆Cash -0.320 (-1.06) -0.434 (-1.24) -0.192 (-0.93) 
∆Tax_Bnft_Opt -13.622 (-1.55) 0.241 (0.02) -4.032 (-0.51) 
∆For_Inc 0.001 (0.28) -0.014 (-0.50) -0.001 (-0.20) 
∆NOL -0.004 (-0.16) -0.753 (-1.52) -0.001 (-0.14) 
Return 0.821*** (8.60) 0.914*** (9.73) 0.762*** (8.00) 
S&PRatingt -0.112*** (-13.17) -0.116*** (-13.18) -0.106*** (-13.01) 
Observations 9314 9905 12341 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.068 0.066 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating for high versus low tax-avoiding 
firms. The dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is the change in S&P firm’s credit rating from year t to year t-1, where Ratingit is firm 
i’s Standard & Poor’s credit rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA (extremely strong capacity to 
meet financial commitments) and are converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA). CSR_Index is total strengths minus 
total weaknesses in the MSCI ESG five social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product; 
GAAP_ETR is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for observations in the top quartile of GAAP_ETR and zero otherwise. 
Cash_ETR is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for observations in the top quartile of Cash_ETR and zero otherwise. BTD 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for observations in the top quartile of BTD and zero otherwise. In all three columns, 
the dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in firm’s Standard & Poor credit rating from year t to year t+1. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
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Table 12 
 
Panel A: Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spreads 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
Constant 2.531*** (18.08) 2.577*** (20.63) 2.729*** (21.20) 
CSR2_Index -0.032*** (-4.01) -0.030*** (-3.85) -0.035*** (-3.91) 
GAAP_ETR 0.333 (1.13)     
CSR2_Index * GAAP_ETR -0.190*** (-2.73)     
Cash_ETR   0.129 (0.52)   
CSR2_Index * Cash_ETR   -0.027 (-0.42)   
BTD     -0.992*** (-2.81) 
CSR2_Index * BTD     -0.067* (-1.88) 
Size -0.241*** (-10.11) -0.246*** (-11.07) -0.256*** (-10.37) 
ROA -2.902*** (-4.33) -2.115*** (-3.47) -2.508*** (-3.63) 
CFO 0.158 (0.26) 0.250 (0.44) 0.093 (0.15) 
Loss 0.313 (1.36) 0.272 (1.13) 0.285 (1.31) 
Leverage 2.399*** (7.00) 2.399*** (7.83) 2.329*** (6.98) 
INTCOV 0.030 (0.54) 0.018 (0.35) -0.037 (-0.66) 
CAPITAL 0.146 (0.99) -0.048 (-0.35) 0.055 (0.38) 
SUB 0.277*** (2.75) 0.290*** (3.06) 0.220** (2.23) 
BTM 0.998*** (6.39) 1.187*** (9.45) 0.874*** (6.03) 
Return 0.118 (1.44) 0.138* (1.75) 0.143* (1.69) 
Intang -0.341*** (-2.75) -0.462*** (-3.79) -0.414*** (-3.40) 
SG&A 0.216 (1.28) 0.304* (1.80) 0.393* (1.94) 
R&D -0.629 (-0.70) -0.747 (-0.86) -0.658 (-0.73) 
Cash 0.535* (1.74) 0.163 (0.58) 0.451 (1.46) 
Tax_Bnft_Opt -10.999 (-1.39) -10.900 (-1.36) -15.666* (-1.78) 
For_Inc 0.022*** (3.24) 0.024*** (3.88) 0.020*** (3.00) 
NOL 0.043 (0.52) 0.024 (0.33) 1.465*** (3.11) 
Senior -0.566*** (-4.07) -0.560*** (-4.51) -0.534*** (-4.21) 
CreditSensitive -0.763*** (-5.09) -0.793*** (-6.06) -0.830*** (-6.14) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2786 3057 3051 
Adjusted R2 0.612 0.612 0.617 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on bond spread. The dependent variable, Spreadt+1, is 
the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the U.S. Treasury bond yield for 
similar maturity CSR2_Index is total strengths minus total weaknesses in the MSCI ESG seven social rating categories: community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, product, human rights, and corporate governance; GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year 
sum from year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax income for the same five-year period. Cash_ETR 
is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special 
items (SPI). BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} / AT_lag. In all three columns, the dependent 
variable, Spreadt+1, is the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond that firm i issued in year t+1, minus the Treasury 
bond yield with similar maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate two-tail significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard 
errors. 
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Table 13 
 
Panel B: Regression analyses examining the effect of the trade-off between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 ∆S&PRatingt+1 
CSR2_Index 0.017* (1.90) 0.021** (2.47) 0.022*** (2.77) 
GAAP_ETR 0.117 (0.50)     
CSR2_Index * GAAP_ETR 0.204*** (2.79)     
Cash_ETR   -0.073 (-0.31)   
CSR2_Index * Cash_ETR   0.157** (2.21)   
BTD     0.282* (1.71) 
CSR2_Index * BTD     -0.062 (-1.14) 
∆Size 0.869*** (5.34) 0.744*** (4.27) 0.492*** (3.61) 
∆ROA 1.803*** (3.41) 1.213*** (2.69) 2.122*** (5.11) 
∆CFO 1.137** (2.18) 1.287*** (2.65) 1.826*** (4.18) 
Loss -0.788*** (-5.02) -0.740*** (-4.37) -0.788*** (-5.98) 
∆Leverage -1.860*** (-4.56) -2.019*** (-4.99) -2.352*** (-6.84) 
∆INTCOV 0.537*** (6.51) 0.566*** (7.12) 0.477*** (6.81) 
∆Capital -0.085 (-0.31) 0.063 (0.23) -0.110 (-0.45) 
SUB -0.159* (-1.88) -0.170** (-2.09) -0.176** (-2.52) 
∆BTM -0.930*** (-5.07) -0.462** (-2.49) -0.241* (-1.78) 
∆Intang 0.029 (0.33) -0.054 (-0.29) -0.033 (-0.42) 
∆SG&A -0.440 (-0.72) -0.525 (-0.72) -0.204 (-0.46) 
∆R&D 1.417 (0.95) 0.947 (0.38) 1.385 (1.25) 
∆Cash -0.335 (-1.10) -0.431 (-1.22) -0.195 (-0.95) 
∆Tax_Bnft_Opt -13.460 (-1.53) 0.010 (0.00) -4.048 (-0.52) 
∆For_Inc 0.001 (0.26) -0.016 (-0.54) -0.001 (-0.18) 
∆NOL 0.000 (0.02) -0.719 (-1.46) 0.005 (0.54) 
Return 0.820*** (8.59) 0.914*** (9.73) 0.762*** (8.02) 
S&PRatingt -0.110*** (-12.99) V (-12.28) 0.492*** (3.61) 
Observations 9314 9905 12341 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.068 0.066 
This table reports the effect of the interaction between CSR and tax avoidance on firm’s credit rating. The dependent variable, 
∆S&PRatingt+1, is the change in S&P firm’s credit rating from year t to year t-1, where Ratingit is firm i’s Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating in year t. Credit ratings are reported as D (payment default) to AAA (extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments) 
and are converted into numerical values from 1(D) to 22 (AAA). CSR2_Index is total strengths minus total weaknesses in the MSCI 
ESG seven social rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, product, human rights, and corporate 
governance; GAAP_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of income tax expense divided by the sum of the pretax 
income for the same five-year period. Cash_ETR is calculated as five-year sum from year t-4 to year t of cash taxes paid divided by 
the five-year sum of pretax income (PI) less special items (SPI). BTD is calculated as BTD = {PI – [(TXFED + TXFO)/0.35 – TLCF]} 
/ AT_lag. In all three columns, the dependent variable, ∆S&PRatingt+1, is change in firm’s Standard & Poor credit rating from year t 
to year t+1. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate two-tail 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 
